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TN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JACK H. RYAN and EMMA JEAN * 
RYAN, husband and wife, 
* Respondents, 
* 
vs. CASE NO. 16843 






STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Respondent asserts the statement of fact as set 
forth by the Appellant in -his Brief are disputed and the 
following are the uncontroverted facts upon which the Court 
based its findings, which facts are as follows: 
1. That the Appellant, J. Elliot Earl was a joint 
tenant with Anthony v. Haynie, Jr. to the property described 
in the said Complaint by virtue of a Warranty Deed issued to 
them on March 12, 1963. 
2. That the Respondents purchased the undivided 1/2 
interest of Anthony v. Haynie, Jr. in the said property for 
the sum of $27,500.00 after he learned that Mr. Haynie was 
co-tenant on the property with Mr. Earl. Checks for payment 
of the purchase price were issued and delivered to Mr. 
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3. Deeds conveying Anthony B. Haynie's 1/2 interest in 
the property to Respondents were prepared and recorded in 
the office of the County Recorder, Cache County, Utah, on 
March 9, 1979, and on September 17, 1979, respectfully. 
4. That Plaintiff, Jack Ryan issued checks and or paid 
accounts of Appellant totaling the sum of $28,500.00 for his 
1/2 interest in the property first check # 9169 dated 
September 30, 1977 paid and delivered to Elliott Earl in the 




$10,738.10 balance on land 
That on or about the 15th day of November 1977, the Respondent 
paid off Appellant's Earl's loan with First Federal Savings, 
which loan was secured on the property involved in this suit 
in the amount of $12,514.33, Defendant Earl had been paying 
on this loan at the rate of $157.00 per month at 10 perent 
interest. 
5. That thereafter on December 10, 1977, the 
Respondents issued and delivered a check to Jay Elliott 
Earl, upon which was written, "balance on land, paid in 
full", (Plaintiff Exhibit 4) plus delivered to him a state-
ment for repairs on his forklift and payment for back 
water taxes on the farm. 
-2-
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6. That through an inadvertent mistake, the 
Respondents deducted the foregoing payments from the sum of 
$27,500.00 (See Exhibit 7) when in truth and fact it should 
have been $28,500.00, was the agreed sale price. Thereafter 
when this error was discovered by Respondents, they obtained 
a cashiers check for $1,000.00 payable to Jay Elliott Earl 
from First Security Bank, dated March 26, 1979 was delivered 
to the Respondent, together with an additional cashier's 
check for the difference in the payoff of the First Federal 
Savings and Loan in the amount of $247.64. These two checks 
were delivered to Plaintiff at the time demand was made upon 
himn for execution of the Deed for his 1/2 interest in the 
property to the Respondents. The Appellant refused to exe-
cute the deed. 
7. Respondents on or about December 1, 1977 entered 
into possession of the property, removed the Appellants per-
sonal property from the building located upon the property 
and took exclusive possession thereof and immediately com-
menced to construct a new home on the said property. 
8. That between December 1, 1977 and April 1, 1979, 
the Respondents constructed a new home on the said property, 
during which time the Appellant delivered to the home, the 
brick to be used in the construction of the home. Numerous 
-3-
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other visits were made by Appellant to property during the 
time improvements were made thereon by Respondent, and he 
took no action whatever. 
9. That at the time of entering into the possession of 
the above described property, the farm was in generally run-
down condition, the building was in poor condition and 
repair, having broken cinder block, the doors were bent, the 
oil furnace was not operating, castelite remenants stuck to 
the cement floor and the roof was leaking. 
10. That the Respondents, upon entering possession of the 
property, made many valuable improvements on the property, 
consisting of the following to the building: Put in new 
bathroom and shower in the shop, built an office, built a 
saddle room, fixed the roof, rewired the building, put new 
light fixtures in the building, installed rain gutters, 
installed the yard light, built butcher shop with 13Xl5 
freezer, leveled around the shop, built a large sump and 
filled in the various holes. 
11. The Respondents made the following improvements to 
the farm: Hired a surveyor to fix the fence line on the 
South, built new fence and gates, hired a backhoe to dig an 
irrigation ditch from 10th West along the South line of the 
property, had LeGrand Johnson haul 60 truckloads of dirt 
-4-
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from the spring area, made a new irrigation ditch to carry 
the waters to the West side of the property so the same 
could be properly irrigated, drained the property, dug a new 
water· well for culinary use which was piped into the new 
home and. the shop, plowed and leveled the North half of the 
property and planted alfalfa~ hauled numerous loads of 
gravel on the road. 
12. That the Respondents paid the 1978 taxes on the said 
property and that thereafter the Appellant paid the same 
taxes on the said property. 
13. The following facts were controverted: The 
Respondents claim that the Appellant entered. into an oral 
agr~ement on or about September 30, 1977 to sell his 1/2 
interest in the property for the sum of $28,500.00 and told 
them to go ahead and pay off the loan at the First Federal 
Savings and Loan as part of the consideration. The balance 
of the purchase after payment of the loan would be payable 
to the Respondents, and that when the said payment was 
made, the Appellant ~efused to sign the deed claiming that 
he had never agreed to sell the property to the Respondents, 
but on the alternative, wanted to have the property appraised 
and partitioned. 
-5-
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ARGUMENT AND LAW 
POINT I 
AN ORAL OR IMPLIED CONTRACT IS ENFORCEABLE 
Contracts· are said to be either expressed or implied. 
Contracts are expressed when their terms are stated by the 
parties. There are times wh~n c6ntracts may be implied, 
when the terms are not so stated. Thus, implied contracts 
is one inferred from- the-conduct of the parties though not 
expressed in words. Implied-- contract in fact are inferred 
. - . from the facts and circumstances of the case and are not 
formally or explicitly stated in words. The only difference 
between an'expressed contract and an implied contract is 
that in the former, the parties have arrived at their 
agreement by words, whether oral or written, while in the 
latter, their agreement is arrived at by consideration of 
their acts and conduct, arid that in both of these cases 
there is iri fact a contract existing between the parties. 
The only difference being the character of the evidence 
necessary to establish it. In other words, in an expressed 
contract all of the terms and conditions are expressed between 
the parties-while an implied contract, some one or more of 
the terms and conditions may be implied from the conduct of 
the parties. An implied contract between two parties arises 
when the facts are such that an intent may be 
-6-
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inferred on their part to make a contract. All pertinent 
circumstances must taken into consideration. (17 AM Jur 
2d, Contracts, Section 3, pg. 335) 
In 77 Am Jur 2d, pg. 617, it states that "The 
Purchaser in a contract for sale and purchase 
of land has several legal and equitable remedies 
ag~inst the vendor when the latter ~rongfully fails 
or refuses to perform his part of the contract to 
conve~·to the purchas~r the kind of title which 
he 1s contracted to convey. If the vendor is able 
but unwilling or refuses t6.convey title to the land 
as contracted to do, the vendee may proceed in equity 
for specific performance". Respondents are seeking 
specific performance. 
77 Am.Jr 2d, Section 113 states that in order for that 
person to be entitled to specific performance, must show 
that the contract is fair and equitable and free from any 
fraud or misrepresentation or overreaching on his part. 
That the Respondents have done. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY SUPPORTS THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT. 
IF THERE IS COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT 
THE SUPREME COURT ON REVIEW MUST VIEW THE SAME IN THE 
-7-
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LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO SUSTAIN THE JUDGMENT 
Upon review by the Supreme Court, the Utah Supreme 
Court has stated the rule as follows: 
"On Conflicting matters, evidence on appeal 
is to be viewed in the light most favorable 
to the part for whom the Judgment was entered 
and when so viewed, if there is sufficient 
competent evidence to support the judgment, 
it will not be disturbed". (See Christensen 
vs. Christensen, 339 Pacific 2d 101, 103, 
Staley vs. Grants, 2 Utah 2d 421, ·276 P2d 489. 
and Erickson vs. Bennison, Utah 503 P2d 141. 
In Ervell vs. Salt Lake City Corp. 493 P2~, 1283, 1285, 
Judge Crocket made the following statement which seems to 
apply to the Appellant herein when he said: 
"In preface to discussion of the various 
contentions of the appellant Railroads 
it should be said that they have indulged 
in the euphoric fallacy so common to losing 
litigants: a blithe persistence in assuming 
that the facts are as they desire to see 
them, rather than as they were seen by the 
jury. It therefore seems necessary to reiterate 
the basic rule of review: that we are obliged 
to survey the evidence, and all reasonable 
inferences that could fairly be drawn therefrom 
in the light favorable to the verdict and Judgment". 
The Respondent, Ryan, recognizes that an oral 
agreement must be established by clear, unequivical and 
definite evidence, (See Ravill vs. Price, 123 Utah 559, 26 
P2d 579. This burden the Plaintiff assumed and proved in 
this case. The evidence provided in this case is summarized 
as follows: 
-8-
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1. That prior to July 12, 1977 Jack Ryan, the 
Plaintiff entered into negotiations with the Defendant, 
Elliott Earl to purchase the property which is the 
subject matter of the litigation (TR pp 107-21) and at 
that time, the Plaintiff thought that the Defendant, Earl, 
was the sole owner of the said property, (TR pp 108-23). 
That on or about July 12, 1977, the Plaintiff offered to 
purchase from Earl, the above described property for the sum 
of $55,000.00 and issued a check of down payment in the 
amount of $5,000.00, which check was held by the Defendant 
and never accepted or cashed and was later returned to 
Plaintiff. (TR p 108) 
2. That in subsequent negotiations, the Plaintiff learned 
that the Defendant, Earl did not own the fee title of the 
said property but in fact owned a 1/2 interest in the pro-
perty and the other 1/2 interest was owned by Anthony B. 
Haynie, Jr. (TR p 109). That at the suggestion of the 
Defendant, Earl, Mr. Ryan, on or about the 23rd day of 
September, 1977, negotiated a purchase of Anthony Haynie's 
1/2 interest in the property for the sum of $27,500.00 (TR pp 
109-110) and (TR p 125), and received a deed from Mr. Haynie 
(Exhibits 18 & 19). The Plaintiff informed Mr. Earl that he 
-9-
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had purchased Mr. Haynie's 1/2 interest for $27,500.00. 
(TR p 128-5). The Plaintiff, Mr. Ryan then made a new offer 
on or about September 30, 1977 to Mr. Earl of $28,500.00 for 
his 1/2 interest in the property, the same being $1,000.00 
rt -
more than paid to Mr. Haynie. (TR pp 128 and 171-18). Mr. 
-j 1 r , , 
Earl said he'd go along with this, and told Ryan to pay off 
his loan at First Federal Savings (TR p 128). Mr. Ryan 
gave Mr. Earl a check for ·d~wn p~yment of $5,000.00. (TR pp 
. • i "'"" : ~ ' I 1 f . ~ 
128-22). (See also Plaintiff Exhibit No. 3) on which check 
1 < ~ ~ .. r 
was written the following: 
$28,500.00 
12, 761. 90 Loan 
5,000.00 
$10,738.0Q Balance on Land 
. Pla:in-tiff, Mr. Ryan -the.n proceeded .to pay. off Ea.rl' s 
loan at .First Federal Savings, by mak~ng a 1·loan of 
$70,000.00 at First Federal, (Plaintiff Exhibit No. 26)~ and 
from this loan the Plaintiff paid off Earl's loan of 
$12,514.33 on or about November 15, 1~77. (Plaintiff 
Exhibit No. 25) 
3. On December 10, 1977, Plaintiff delivered a check for 
$9,587.01 (Plaintiff Exhibit 4) plus a paid bill for $151.09 
(Plaintiff-Exhibit No. 7) for payment of back water.taxes 
and some work done on Defendant's forklift. This check-was 
-10-
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given to Defendants partner, Mr. Hill at Defendant's new 
place of business. Two days later Defendant, however, told 
Ryan he had received checks (TR pp 131-25) and looked over 
the figures and everything seemed alright (TR 131-25) 
4. That on or about December 1, 1977, the Plaintiff 
Ryan, entered into exclusive possession of the above 
described property (TR pp 66-6, 238-10) and commenced to 
make valuabl~ improvement on the property to the land and 
the cinder block building expending $15,000.00 to 
$20,000.00, (TR 157-158) which improvements consisted of 
the following: Replacing the damaged block in front of the 
door on the cinder block building, repairing the roof on 
the cinder block building, rewiring the cinder block 
building, installing new light fixtures, rain gutters and 
yard lights on the cinder block building, installing new 
motor in the furnace in the cinder block building, straightening 
the overhead doors, installing the new woodburning stove, 
installing the new bathroom and shower in the shop in the 
cinder block building, constructing a new butcher shop which 
is attached to the cinder block building, building of a 
freezer in the building, leveling of the yard around the 
shop, filling the holes and building a large sump for drain 
-11-
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water, hiring of a surveyer to fix the property with the 
~ 
neighbor, building a fence and gates on the property lines, 
hiring a backhoe to dig an irrigation ditch to get the 
waters from 10th West to the West side of the property, 
construction of a drain pond with ditches for draining of 
the land, digging of a new culinary water well and running 
water lines into the new house and the construction of a new 
home on the property (TR ,157). Mr. Ryan also commenced 
building a new home on the p~op~r~y and expended $80,000.00 
'I' ' 
before he ran out of money to finish the house. (TR 159). 
5. Mr. Ryan mistakenly assumed when he paid off the 
loan at First Federal Savings & Loan that the bank would 
follow through and get the deed from Earl for him (TR 130-2, 
See also TR 119-3). 
6. Plaintiff paid the property taxes on the property in 
the Fall of 1978, (Exhibit 9) Defendant a month later paid 
the taxes on the same property. 
7. In early 1979, when Mr. Ryan learned he didn't have 
the title (TR 144-5) he contacted his attorney and realized 
that he owed $1,247.64 additional amount. Plaintiff then 
purchased cashier checks arid delivered them to Defendant 
(Plaintiff Exhibit No. 8), and demanded a deed which the 
-12-
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Defendant refused and claimed there was no agreement to sell 
his property. 
After reviewing Appellant's Brief, it appears that 
there is no dispute as to the law that is applicable in 
this case. The differences are one of fact. The Defendant 
claims that there is no conduct of the parties that could 
be constructed as acceptance thereby creating a contract. 
This is not true. Let us summarize the evidence what this 
conduct was. 
1. At TR 128-6 I asked the question ·Of Mr. Ryan about 
the formation of the contract on September 30, 1977: 
Q. What did Elliott (Defendant) say? 
A. Well, he says--I don't know just what he said then, 
but then I told him that I'd like to buy his piece 
now, so I could have it all in one piece and that 
I'd give him another thousand dollars for it and he 
says, "Well, that sounds pretty good." He says 
that he'd go with that and we would have an 
agreement on that but that it would be my ground at 
twenty-eight and that the extra thousand dollars 
made the difference. 
Q. $28,500.00; is that correct? 
A. Yes, $28,500.00 and at that time is when he told me 
to go up and pay the loan off and get it all 
straightened around. 
Q. Did you issue a check to Mr. Earl at that time? 
A. I gave him a chec.k for $5,000.00 and he told me at 
that time, he say, "I can't cash this now on 
account of my divorce trouble and the things that I 
have there so I'll just have to keep it until I 
find out whether I have to buy a new home or any of 
these other things. So he says, "I'll just put it 
-13-
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in the drawer here until such time I can do this." 
Q. Did you ever tell him in any way that he couldn't 
cash that check? 
A. No. I told him that the check was.as good as gold. 
He could cash it anytime he wanted. It would be 
the sooner the better for me. 
Q. You gave him the check on September 30, Mr. Ryan, 
and did you make_ an effort then to pay off the loan 
at First Federal Savings? 
A, Yes, I made arrangeme,nts to. get the money and that 
there--to pay the loan off. That's when I went up 
and borrowed the $70,000.DO. 
2. In mid December 1977 Defendant told Plaintiff he'd 
received the check of $9,587.01 and everything seemed 
alright and he put it in the drawer because he still didn't 
know how he ~as going to come -0ut on his divorce deal. At 
(TR 131-25) to TR 132-4) Ryan· again ·testified: 
A. Yes, at that time ·he told. me he received the check 
and looked over the figures and everything and 
eve~rything. seems _.to be alr_ight, and he put it in 
the drawer with the other one because he still 
didn '-t know just how he was going to come out on 
his divorce deal and that. 
3. The Plaintiffs went into exclusive possession of 
the property and moved Defendant's stuff from the building 
,. 
without his permission. Defendant Earl testified as 
follows: (TR 238-7) 
... 
Q. ·with regard to the situation there, isn '.t it true 
that Jack took exclusive possession of the building 
after he went into possession? 
A. Without permission, yes. 
Q. And he moved all of your stuff out? 
A. Without permission, yes. · 
-14-
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4. ·After Mr. Ryan had taken possession he started 
making many improvements. At TR 153-17 I asked Mr. Ryan 
the following: 
Q. In connection with all of these improvements was Mr. 
Earl down there when you were making these improve-
ments and saw these? 
A. ·yes. Like I said~ a number of times, one time he 
come down there for a water tank and a pump and 
another time he came down to get something out of 
the station wagon. 
Q. At any of those occasions did he offer to give you 
your check back and say that he hadn't sold the 
property to you? 
A. He never mentioned anything about any deal at all. 
Other than things like it looks like you're really 
changing the face of this place. 
Q. Did he ever exert any right to possession or assume 
any'rights torpossession? 
A. No, he never did. When he wanted to use any of it, 
it was when he came·down with that camper and 
wanted permission to keep it up there. 
5. The Plaintiffs immediately started building a new 
home on the property and spent up to $80,000.00 when their 
money ran out. (TR 159-3) During the construction on the 
home the Defendant, Mr. Earl, delivered brick for the home. 
At TR 242-5 Mr. Earl testified as follows: 
Q. But during the course of construction you delivered 
the brick? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Certainly you knew there was a nice home because it 
was up to square? 
A. Sure. 
Q. Did you do anything to protect your interest in 
that half of the property under that home? 
-15-
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A. I thought that until I had made some kind of a com-
mitment that I was in the driver's seat and it 
would be up to Jack to.come around and take care of 
those obligations. 
6. In the Fall of 1978 almost one year after 
Plaintiffs took possession the Defendant called Mr. Ryan and 
asked for permission to put his camper on the property for 
the winter. Mr. Ryan testifed as follows at (TR 155-8): 
A. Well, he phoned up and my wife answered the phone. 
She called me down there and he asked permission to 
put his camper out there because he didn't have no 
place to put it. 
7. Defendant never offered to pay for any of the 
improvements (TR 163-7). Mr. Ryan's testimony: 
Q. Did he ever offer to pay you anything for any of 
the improvements either to the land or building? 
A. No. 
8. During cross examination the Defendant stated to Mr. 
Ryan that he would sell for a fair pr ice, (TR 243-7) Mr. Earl' E 
testimony: 
Q. Isn't it true, in fact, that you told him you would 
sell that property at a fair price? 
A. Yes, I did. 
See also (TR 51-8) 
The testimony of Plaintiff's two appraisers, Nixon and 
Balls, and the appraiser of Defendant, Tom Singleton, show 
that the price offered of $28,500.00 was more than appraised 
value. See testimony of Jack Nixon and Lynn Balls and Tom 
Singleton. (TR 12 Nixon - TR 192 to 196-21 Balls) 
to 211-15 Singleton). 
-16-
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9. After Plaintiff paid off Earl's loan at First 
Federal Savings and Loan, Defendant was relieved of making 
the monthly loan payment of approximately $157.00 per month 
and went from November 1977 to the date of trial tw9 years 
and never paid any monthly payment or interest to Mr. Ryan 
(TR 64-1) • 
10. Defendant claims he was after Plaintiff to get an 
agreement all through these many months. Yet Defendant was 
in contact with his attorney, Mr. Lanny Gunnell, and never made 
any effort to get him t~ make the agreement or do anything 
to assert any rights to the property. See TR 245-3 to TR 
245-15) 
11. Defendant r&cei~ed the ch~cks and kept them until 
the suit was commenced, when he refused to sign a deed. I 
asked Mr. Ryan the following at (TR 246-13): 
Q. But you seemed intent on keeping the checks, didn't 
you, which you did. You kept the checks? 
A. Yes, I kept the checks. 
Then at TR 162-5 I asked Mr. Ryan: 
Q. Between the time you gave the checks to Mr. Earl 
and the time you went to get the deed signed, did 
he ever of fer to return the checks to you or give 





Then I asked the following question at TR 162-21: 
Did, you ever, when you saw him from time to time 
after you gave the checks to him, did you ask him 
why he hadn't cashed the checks? 
Yes, a number of times. 
What did he say? 
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A. Well, to start with, it was the divorce and then he 
was going to buy some land and then later on he was 
going to buy a diesel truck and then he was on that 
land again. Q. At any of those occasions ,that you talked to him 
about it, did he ever say he was not going to cash 
those checks? 
A. No, he never did tell me he wasn't going to cash 
them. , , 
Q. Did he ever offer to pay you anything for any of 
the improvements either to the land or building? 
A. No. 
The foregoing evidence clearly supports the court's 
Finding No. 4 of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. 
The trial Court from the evidence made its Finding No. 
5 which reads as follows: (File 73-74) 
"The Court finds that an oral contract 
was entered into between the parties was 
clear, definite and mutually understood 
and .established by clear unequivical and 
different testimony or other evidence 
presented in the above matter. The 
Court further finds that some of the 
testimony was disputed, but that such 
disputed testimony does not bar the 
finding that the contract was 
established by the evidence. The Court 
finds the only dispute in the evidence 
was that of a conversation of September 
30, 1977. Plaintiff testified that a 
contract was .formed, that the reason 
the Defendant did not deposit the check 
for $5,000.00 down payment, was because 
of the uncertainty of a pending divorce 
proceeding. The Defendant testified and 
claims that.he was holding the check as 
"a good faith offer". The Court deter-
mines that the testimony of the Plaintiff 
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was more convincing to the Court. That 
subsequent actions of the Defendant 
support the Plaintiff's version of the 
oral contract. The Court finds that 
the Defendant never again asserted any 
claims of ownership in the property from 
the time he surrendered possession thereof 
to the Plaintiffs, until he duplicated the 
payment of the property taxes on the property 
on November 30, 1978, which taxes the Defendant 
paid after the Plaintiff had paid the taxes on 
the said property.. That Defendant did not 
store his pickup or boat on the property 
after he deliv,ered possession -to the Plaintiffs, 
even though he needed storage for these items, 
and the Defendant made no objection to the 
outside storage of his property that was 
stored in the building prior to the contract. 
That Defendant asked for permission from -
the Plaintiff, Jack Ryan, to store his camper 
on the property in the fall of 1~78 1 and 
allowed the Plaintiff to designate the 
place for its storage. That Defendant did 
not object to the payment of the morgage by 
the Plaintiff, .and was relieved of making 
the monthly payments thereon. That Defendant 
received and kept the second check -in the sum 
of $9,587.01 plus a bill marked paid without 
objection until :after this suit was filed. 
That Defendant unloaded brick for the Plaintiff 
at the time he was constructing a new house on the 
said property in Spring of 1978, at which time 
the house was .up to a square without any ob-
jections being made by the Defendant. That 
Defendant _al-lowed th-e ,Plaintiff to make valuable 
improvements on the property as set forth in 
paragraph 4 above, and the Court further finds 
that in all matters, the Defendant acted as if 
the property was.owned by teh Plaintiff exclusively 
until after the full purchase price was tendered 
to him in March of 1979, when he refused to execute 
a deed to the Plaintiff. This action was then 
commenced on April 12, 1979. 
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POINT III 
PART PERFORMANCE OF AN ORAL CONTRACT REMOVES A CONTRACT 
FOR SALE OF LAND FROM THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
It is clear that the-law states that part performance 
on the part:of a vendee removes a contract from the sale 
of land from the Statute of Frauds. 
Section 25-5-8 U.C.A. 1953 provides, 
"Nothing in this chapter contained shall be construed 
to abr idg~ the. pow,er of the Courts to compel the speci-
fic performance of agreemeents in case of part perfor-
mance thereof". 
Where there is no memorandum reduced to writing and 
no writing subscribed by the parties to be charged, but the 
owner had accepted the consideration and surrendered 
possession, there was sufficient part performance to avoid 
the Statu~ of Frauds. (See Henry Madsen's Estate, 259 
2d 595). 
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Ravarino vs. 
Price, 260 2d, 579, states the general rule on part perfor-
mance as follows: 
I 
"It is to be noted that possession by 
the Plaintiff. is regarded as an impor-
tant fact, one of which is generally 
directly referable to a contract, and 
when combined with pe_rmanent valuable 
improvements which are representative 
of the existance of the oral contract, 
-20-
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virtually every jurisdiction grants 
specific performance. The same limita-
tion, of course, is placed on the 
Plaintiffs' possession as found when 
improvements are relied upon, it must 
be of such a nature that it would not 
have been given without the presence of 
the oral contract to convey." 
In the Wooley vs. Brown, 529 P 2d, 1035, appears to be 
the last decision in this general area, the Utah Supreme 
Court stated it could not permit a party to accept perfor-
mance for many years and then claim terms contrary to the 
evidence as basis to substantiate an assertion of indef inate-
ness and thus avoid specific performance. The conduct of 
the parties is totally consistant with the existence of an 
oral contract as claimed by the Plaintiff. When Mr. Ryan 
was asked as to whether or not he would have made these 
costly improvements on the property if, in fact, there had 
not been a contract, he answered as follows: (TR 250-4) 
Q. Jack, if you had had any knowledge or indication 
from Mr. Earl that he would not sell his one-half 
interest, would you have gone· ahead and built your 
home on that property? 
A. "No way". 
After the following objection the witness then 
answered: "No, I wouldn't have built anything nor 
done anything. I would have grabbed my checks or 
whatever and ran and wouldn't get involved in no 
deals". (See TR 250-13) 
The Utah Supreme Court discusses at length the part 
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performance Ravarino vs. Price Utah 260 P 2d, 570 where at 
page 578 it states: 
"In order that a Plaintiff may be permitted 
give evidence of a contract not in writing, and 
which is in the very teeth of the statute and 
nullity at law, is essential that he establish 
(in equity) by clear and positive proof, acts 
and things done in pursuance and on account 
thereof, exclusively referable thereto, which 
will take it out of the operation of the statute." 
The Utah Court, at page 579 states: 
"It is to be noted that possession by the 
Plaintiff is regarded as an improtant fact, 
one which is generally directly referable to 
a contract, and when combined with permanent 
and valuable improvements which are repre-
sentative of the existance of an oral cbntract, 
virtually every jurisdiction will grant 
specific performance. The same limitation, 
of course, is placed on the Plaintiff's 
possession as is found when improvements-
are relied upon: it must be of such a 
nature that it would not have been gi~en 
without the presence of an oral contact 
to convey." 
The Utah Court went on and held in the Ravino case that 
the Plaintiff in that case did not acquire possession of the 
property owned by the Defendant. This is not the case 
before the Court. In Ravarino vs. Price the Utah Supreme 
Court states that the grantor of the "Terry Strip" had no 
interest in Defendant's property, and therefore, possession 
of the "Terry Strip" could not be possession of Defendant's 
property. 
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'The facts of the Ravarino case are not the same as our 
case. There are basic principles discussed in the Ravarino 
case which are applicable in our case. In our case there 
is no question that the Plaintiffs went into possession of 
the property owned by the Defendant. This possession 
coupled with the making of substantial valuable improvements 
constitute sufficient part performance and would work a 
substantial hardship and injustice if the specific perfor-
mance was not granted. 
The Defendant cites Christensen vs. Christensen, Utah 
339 P2d ld4. The Plaintiff agrees with the principals 
stated in this case. The Plaintiff asserts that the 
contract was definite, clear and unambiguous. The sale 
price for the Defendant's interest in the property was 
$28,500.00 to be paid in cash. That upon payment of the 
cash, the Defendant was to deliver a Deed to the property. 
The date of possession was established by the Plaintiff 
going into possession in December of 1977. 
The Defendant argues that the possession of one co-
tenant is for the benefit of all co-tenants. This might be 
true if possession was all that was involved. But we have 
substantial improvements coupled with possession based upon 
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an oral contract. It seems completely illogical for the 
Defendant to assert his position when substantial valuable 
improvements were made upon the property by the Plaintiffs 
when he made no objection or did nothing. These improve-
ments would not have been made if there had not been an oral 
contract. No person in their right mind is going to enter 
upon the property of another and build a new home and other 
improvements upon the property at a cost of exceeding 
$100,000.00 when they did not have reason to believe that 
there was an oral contract to convey the property. 
Defendant argues that the improvements made upon the 
property by a co-tenant are for the benefit of the co-tenant 
not adverse to them. The evidence before the Court, show 
the home that was build by Mr. Ryan upon the property for his 
family. Is Mr. Earl claiming rights to 1/2 interest in the 
home? Certainly such reasoning is inconceivable. The 
nature of the improvements made upon the property by the 
Plaintiff are completely inconsistent with a tenant in com-
mon situation. The nature of the improvements made and the 
extent thereof was for the Plaintiff's own use and benefit 
and not for Mr. Earls benefit. Plaintiffs had ousted Mr. 
Earl from the property. Notice that Plaintiffs were 
claiming the property adverse to Defendant is shown by the 
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fact of the building of the new home on the property. The 
action of the Plaintiff's right~ clearly show Plaintiffs 
were acting adverse to Defendant's rights. 
In light of the foregoing it is clear that the evidence 
supports by clear and convincing evidence, the existence of 
a contract. The part performance by the Plaintiff herein, 
required.the Court to enter its Order of Specific 
Performance under the rules announced in the Ravarino vs. 
Price case Supra. 
In the case of Woolsey vs. Brown 539 P2d 1035, appears 
to be the last Utah decision in this general area, and the 
Court in that case, states: 
" Equity will not permit a party to accept 
performance for many years and then claim 
terms contrary to the evidence as a basis 
to substantiate an assertion of indef inateness 
and thus avoids specific performance." 
CONCLUSION 
From the foregoing it is clear that the evidence sup-
ports the findings of contract to sell and convey the pro-
perty to the Plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have met their bur-
den by clear and convincing evidence. The trial Court ana-
lized the evidence correctly. There is no attempted fabri-
cation of a contract here. Plaintiff is entitled to a 
decree of Specific Performance and the judgment of the trial 
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Court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this /~ day of April, 1980. 
, 
HARRIS, PRESTON & GUTKE 
. ·.·-~--~.~··· " . - -:::-?.A.-~ -By•-:-- <.., - . tPY'Y'"'~~ 
. '"": c ~-· 
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